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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Eakin v. People's Hotel Co., 54 S.W. 87, is one of the many
cases showing that the reasonableness of an attorney's fee
Attorney's depends as much upon the importance of the con-
Fee. troversy as upon the amount and character of the
Amount services rendered. In that case the attorney was
one of four who conducted a case through the Circuit Court
and Circuit Court of Appeals, resulting in a verdict of $16,ooo
for his client. The attorney did not actually argue the case,
but he watched it all through and gave advice concerning its
management. Under these circumstances the Court of Chan-
cery Appeals of Tennessee decided that his claim for a fee of
8oo was not excessive.
An attorney cannot set off an unliquidated claim against his
client for services performed- in an action against
Set off him by the client for money collected for the
client: McCracken v. Harned, 44 Atl. (N. J.) 959.
BANKRUPTCY.
Is a debt owing by a commission merchant to his principal
for goods consigned to be sold on commission, a debt created
Fiduciary by "fraud, misappropriation or defalcation, or
Capacity while acting in a fiduciary capacity," within § 17
of the Bankruptcy Act? Under the acts of 1841 and 1867
several state and lower federal courts decided that commission
merchants were fiduciaries, but in In Re Basch, 97 Fed. 761,
which was the first. case on that point under the new act, the
District Court (S. D. N. Y.) follows several late decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in holding that they
do not come within the section.
Where, under a state law, a lien is given upon a fund in
Landlord', the hands of any assignee for the payment of
Ulen debts, such a lien takes precedence in the distribu-
tion in bankruptcy without any necessity on the part of the
holder of the lien to assert it previously in the state court: In
Re Byrne, 97 Fed. 762.
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The practice of sending attorneys and their clerks to vote
at creditors' meetings receives a rebuke from Judge Brown
in In Re Blankfein, 97 Fed. 19i, where he holds
Attorneys that even an attorney at-law is not authorized to
vote on behalf of the creditor, but the latter must send his
duly constituted attorney-in-fact.
Where the creditors show their inability to elect a trustee
by wasting the time of two meetings without coming to any
Trust result, the referee may appoint a trustee, and if
no objection appears against the person ap-
pointed such appointment will be sustained by the court:
In Re Kuffter, 97 Fed. 187.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Aldrich v. Campbell, 97 Fed. (Circ. Ct. of App., 9th Circ.)
663, is important as throwing some additional light on the
rNtfoosi vexed question of the conclusiveness of an assess-
Bank, ment by the comptroller of the currency upon the
Assessment stockholders of an insolvent national bank. In
Agzainst
Stockholders this case the receiver of the bank, acting under
by the instructions of the comptroller, and by virtue
Co-ptroli of assessments made by him, had brought two
actions at law against the stockholder, the total of the two
assessments being less than the par value of the stock. The
stockholder wished to set up the fact that the sum of the two
assessments exceeded the total indebtedness of the bank, but
knowing that it would be useless to plead that defence to the
action by the receiver, he attempted to make use of a dictum
by the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v. Knox,
102 U. S. 422, which was as follows: "Although assessments
made by the comptroller under the circumstances of the first
a ssessment, in this case, and all other assessments, successive
or otherwise, not exceeding the par value of all the stock of
the bank, are conclusive upon the stockholders, yet if he were
to attempt to enforce one made, clearly and palpably, contrary
to the views we have expressed, it cannot be doubted that a
court of equity, if its aid were invoked, would promptly
restrain him by injunction."
Acting upon this suggestion, the stockholder in Aldrkk v.
Cawnpbell filed a bill in equity against the receiver to enjoin
the prosecution of the action at law on the ground above
stated, and also upon the ground that the comptroller had
"exhausted his jurisdiction by the levy of the first assessment.
His attempt, however, failed, the court holding (i) that the
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assessments by the comptroller were conclusive upon the
stockholder as to the bank's indebtedness, whether the ques-
tion were raised in law or equity, and that the dictum in U. .£
v. Knox was to be restricted to the facts of that case, viz.,
where the comptroller was attempting to make the solvent
stockholders liable for the shares of the insolvent stockholders,
and (2) that the comptroller could levy as many assessments
as he might think necessary, up to the limits of the stock-
holder's liability. On this last point the court probably over-
ruled De Weese v. Smith, 97 Fed. 309, noticed in 39 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER (N. S.) 104, although the case was not men-
tioned. The decision in the latter case was strongly criticized
in 39 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (N. S.) 185.
BROKERS.
Saule v. Ryan, 53 S. W. 977, will be of interest to business
men who are required to take out a license to transact busi-
ucense to ness. A statute of Tennessee rendered it unlawful
Do Business, for real estate brokers to transact business without
Retroactive a license. In an action by a broker for his com-
Effet mission, it appeared that the sale by the broker
had been made on January I, x898, and that on February 5,
1898, the broker applied for and obtained a license to transact
business for one year from January I, 1898. The Court of
Chancery Appeals of Tennessee held that the broker could
not recover, on the grbund that the subsequent issue of the
license could not validate the unlawful transaction, even
though the license purported to take effect from January I,
1898. A decision to the contrary is Mach. Co. v. Caldwell,
I6 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (Ind.), 554.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Upon the ground thaf it is within the police powers of the
state, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has upheld the con-
-. Scp Act" stituti6nality of the so-called "Scrip Act," or act
constitution. requiring employers to redeem scrip orders for
,airy. wages in cash: Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co.
53 S. W. 955. The courts of the various states are almost
equally divided upon this question, Pennsylvania being one of
those in which such an act is unconstitutional. The question
does not seem to have been decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, but since Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 386,
there is a strong probability that this court would recognize
the existence of the police power to protect workmen to this
extent.
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CONTRACTS.
The doctrine that a mistake of a foreign law is to be re-
garded as a mistake of fact led to an interesting result in
Make o Rosenbaum v. U. S. Credit System Co. 44 Atl. 967.
Foreign Law, The defendant engaged the plaintiff in New Jersey
Fraud to transact credit-insurance for it in Massachusetts,
where it was forbidden by law. In an action for breach of the
contract, it appeared that the defendant was aware of the
Massachusetts law, but that the plaintiff was not. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held that there could be no
recovery upon the illegal contract, but that the action of the
defendant in concealing from the plaintiff the existence of a
material fact, viz., the law of Massachusetts, amounted to a
fraud upon the plaintiff, who could recover damages for injury
resulting from such fraud.
The Supreme Court of Maine has decided that a contract
of employment for a certain time at a stipulated sum per week
Separate is an entire contract, for breach of which only one
Actions for action may be brought. Thus in Alie v. Nadeau,
Breach of 44Atl. 891, the defendant employed the plaintiff
Ent'" contract for six months from November 9, 1897, at $IO per
week. On May 12, 1898, the plaintiff, having been discharged,
brought an action and recovered a judgment for wages due
to May 12, which judgment was satisfied. Subsequently the
plaintiff brought an action for the wages accruing from May
12 to the end of the six months. Held, that since the con-
tract was indivisible, there was an irrebutable presumption
that the plaintiff had recovered in the first action all that he
was entitled to under the contract.
CORPORATIONS.
Of late years the courts have greatly relaxed the rule which
held it ultra sives of a private corporation to become tlie
A.COoadA accommodation endorser of negotiable paper. In
tion Murphy v. Improvement Co., 97 Fed. (C. Ct., U.
Endorsement D. Ark.), 722, it was held that where the assent
of all the stockholders is obtained, such an accommodation
endorsement is valid even in the absence of a charter power
to that effect, provided the rights of creditors are not impaired
thereby.
The name of Mr. George H. Earle, Jr., Receiver of the
Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia, has been
Liabity of associated with a number of interesting cases on
Stockholder the liability of stockholders in insolvent corpora-
After sale tions. The latest of these is Earle v. Coyle, 97 Fed.
of Stock 410, where it appeared that in 1894 Coyle, a stock-
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holder in the bank, sold his stock at auction to William Steele,
the cashier of the bank; that the auctioneer delivered the
certificate to Steele; that no transfer was made on the books
to Steele, but the bank paid the dividends to Steele until 1897,
when it failed. In an action by the receiver against Coyle to
hold him liable on his stock, the plaintiff insisted that there
had been no valid transfer from Coyle, by reason of a by-law
of the bank providing that "no officer of the bank, except
the president and vice-president, shall, without the permission
of the directors, hold stock in the bank," so that the transfer
to Steele, the cashier, was void. The Circuit Court of Appeals.
(Third Circuit) decided that the defendant and the auctioneer
had performed their duty as " careful, prudent business men,"
that they had the right to assume that the directors had spe-
cially empowered Steele-to hold the stock, and this inference
was further justified by the fact that the dividends had been
paid to Steele for three years. Judgment for the defendant
was therefore affirmed.
COURTS.
A state court has jurisdiction to enforce the common law
liability of a United States officer for acts growing out of his
Jurisdiction obedience to writs of the Federal Court. Thus,
I. Suit in Park v. Hayden, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 265, the mar-
Against shal had seized a tug of plaintiff by virtue of a
United States writ of execution issuing out of the District Court
Marshal of the United States. In an action against the
marshal, in the state court of New York, for negligently
allowing the tug to deteriorate in value while in his posses-
sion, the Supreme Court of New York assumed jurisdiction
and allowed a recovery. _
CRIMINAL LAW.
In State v. Anderson, 59 Pac. i8o, on the trial of an indict-
ment for ralie, the prosecution offered no testimony except that
Rape, of the p'rosecutrix, a child of thirteen years. The
conviction on trial judge charged the jury as follows : "You
Testimony'of are hereby instructed that you should not convict
Prosecutrix the defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of
the prosecutrix alone, but such corroboration may be by facts
and circumstances connected with or surrounding the case; in
other words, corroboration is not the testimony of other wit-
nesses." On appeal from a conviction, the Supreme Court of
Idaho decided that the above chargexwas improper, since the
only corroboration which could properly be considered was
corroboration obtained without the evidence of the prosecutrix,
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As the court remarked, "It (the charge) was virtually saying
to the jury that the prosecution might be corroborated by her
own statements." It was then contended, on behalf of the
state, that the question had been properly submitted to the
jury, even upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecu-
trix, citing Tway v. State, 50 Pac. (Wy.) 188 ; People v. Wessel,
98 Cal. 352. However, the court held that the above quoted
rule applies only where the testimony of the prosecutrix is
unimpeached; and in this case, since it had been shown that
the prosecutrix was of loose character and uncertain reputa-
tion, the question should not have been submitted to the jury
at all, but binding instructions given in favor of the defendant.
The discharge of the latter was therefore ordered.
DAMAGES.
Consideratle comment was caused by a late New Jersey
decision to the effect that a parent could not recover anything
RCtmslve for the death of his one-year old infant, on the
D.m=" ground that the latter would probably cost the
or L-s of parent more than it would gain for him. Follow-
thUd ing in the line of this case, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey has decided that a verdict for $5,ooo for the loss
of a four-year old child should be set aside as excessive:
Graham v. Cons. Traction Co., 44 At. 965. A peculiar feature
of this case was that there had been two trials previous to the
one from which the appeal was taken, at each of which a ver-
dict for $5,ooo had been rendered.
EQUITY.
. There is great diversity among the cases upon the question
whether or not the answer by a corporation to a bill in equity
cezm--tsm is as conclusive as the answer of a natural person,
afAswerby and requires the complainant to produce more
.p oratlon than the testimony of one witness. Some authori-
ties hold that where the corporation's answer is verified by an
officer, with full knowledge of the facts, it is conclusive, but
all agree in holding that, unless it is so verified, it amounts to
nothing more than mere pleading. Such was the case in
Savings Soc. v. Davidson, 97 Fed. (Circ. Ct. of App. 9th Circ.)
696, where the answer of a bank was verified by the cashier,
who showed by his testimony that he was not personally
acquainted with the facts.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Johns v. Johns, 6o N. Y. Suppl. 865, shows that courts some-
times have as much trouble in construing their own judgments
Judgment for as they have in cases of instruments written by
Alimony, laymen. In this case a wife had obtained a divorce
Death of from her husband, the decree commanding the
Respondent yearly payment of alimony, and also the payment
by the respondent of the premiums upon policies of life insur-
ance taken out by him upon his own life in favor of his wife.
Subsequently the respondent died and the widow sued his
estate for alimony accruing after his death, claiming that the
estate was liable for alimony throughout her life. The
Supreme Court of New York decided, partly in view of the
provision for life insurance, that the effect of the judgment for
alimony was to create a liability only during the lives of both
parties, and that no intention appeared to continue the binding
force of the judgment after the respondent's death.
INSURANCE.
In N~orth. Pac. Exp. Co. v. Traders' Ins. Co., 55 N. E. 702,
the defendant insurance company insured the plaintiff express
Construction company " on express matter . . . only while
of Policy to contained in cars while in transit upon lines owned,
Express leased or operated bythe Northern Pacific Railroad
Company Company." The goods were destroyed while on
a line operated by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company at
the date of the policy, but not at the date of the fire. The
Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the policy had reference
to the operation of the line at the time of the execution of the
policy only, therefore the subsequent abandonment by the
railroad previous to the fire did not render the policy inop-
erative.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
InBeelerv. Clarke, 44 Atl. 1038, the defendant, who was the
maker of a note, on being pressed for payment, replied: "I
Implied cannot do it now; I have two members of my
Promise family to support." The Court of Appeals of
to pay; Maryland decided that these words constituted
both an acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and an
implied promise to pay, thus tolling the statute of limitations.
The surety of a note wrote to the payee, requesting him to
collect the money as soon as possible, and stating that, "I
Debt, will no longer be held good on the note, if you let
Acknowledg- him [the debtor] have the money any longer."
ment Held, that this was a sufficient acknowledgment
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of the debt to bring it within the exception to the Nebraska
statute of limitations, which required merely an acknowledg-
ment of the liability: Harms v. Freytag, 8o N. W. [Neb.]
1039.
MORTGAGES.
The North Dakota Code ( 4738) provides that mort-
gagors' signatures to chattel mortgages must be attested by
mortgagee two witnesses. Under this section the Supreme
as Attesting Court of North Dakota decided that the mort-
Witness gagee was incompetent to act as one of the wit-
nesses, and a mortgage attested only by him and a third party
was void: Donovan v. Elevator Co., 8o N. W. 772. In South
Dakota and several other states the contrary view has been
taken, on the ground that the modern rule rendering parties
competent to testify in court has removed the basis for the
objection to their acting as attesting witnesses: Fisher v. Por-
ter, 77 N. W. (S. D.) 112.
NEGLIGENCE.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has sensibly applied the
rule of res ipsa loquitur to the fall of a brick wall, while in course
-Res p of construction by the defendant, whereby the
Loquitur," plaintiff was injured. " The wall was of brick,
FallofWall and it is a matter of common knowledge that
when such cubes are laid upon one another, with care to
keep the wall plumb, it will stand by virtue of the law of grav-
ity ; and a fall of a wall of brick would indicate either that it
had been improperly laid, or that the fall had been caused by
some force from without": Dettmering v. English, 44 Atl. 855.
Where, after a fire, the walls of the building, which hadbeen
left standing, were ordered torn down by the building inspectors,
Independent and the owner employed a contractor to perform
Contractor the work, it was held by the Supreme Court of
Ohio that the duty of removing the walls was one owing to
the public and one which could not be delegated to an inde-
pendent contractor, so as to relieve the owner from liability
for the negligence of the workmen incident to the perform-
ance of the work: Covington v. Cincinnati Bridge Co., 5 5 N. E.
618.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
In Glendal Frmit Co. y. Hirst, 59 Pac. (Ariz.) 103, it was held
that where an action was commenced by attachment and the
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defendant was personally served, the defendant
Judgment in could not object to the entry of judgment against
Excess of
Attachment him in an amount greater than that set out in the
writ of attachment; but of course the decision
would be different if there had been no personal service, as in
cases of foreign attachment, or if the rights of third persons
had intervened.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
It is well settled that where payment of a promissory note
is made to a person not in possession of the note, the burden
Evidence of is on the debtor to show that the payment is made
Authority to an authorized agent of the creditor. In Rhodes
to Receive v. Belchee, 59 Pac. 117, it appeared that A. ap-
Payment pointed B. his agent to sell goods and to receive
in payment promissory notes. B. sold goods of A. to C.,
receiving C.'s note; and after B. had parted with the note, C.
made payment to him. In an action by A. against C., the
Supreme Court of Oregon held that the above facts did not
justify C. in presuming that B. had authority to receive pay-
ment after he had parted with the possession of the note.
REAL PROPERTY.
Campbell v. Sidwell, 55 :N. E. 609, presents one of those
sets of facts involving conflicting liens which a professor of
conflicting real property law delights in laying before his class
Liens, as a puzzle. The case arose from the distribution
Priority of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of land, against
which there were, successively, (I) a vendor's lien, (2) a judg-
ment, and (3) a mortgage. The vendtor's lien was superior to
the judgment, but inferior to the mortgage, while the judg-
ment was, of course, superior to the mortgage. Under cir-
cumstances such as these an astute lawyer could present a
very plausible argument on behalf of the priority of any one
of the three liens, and indeed any result would probably find
support in some decision, although the case has not arisen a
large number of times. The Supreme Court of Ohio solved
the problem on the theory that the vendor's lien, being in the
nature of a secret, unrecorded trust, was the weakest of the
three liens andleast entitled to consideration. They therefore
held that the superiority of the vendor's lien over the judg-
ment was of less weight than the superiority of the mortgage
over the vendor's lien, and, since the judgment was admittedly
superior to the mortgage, they awarded the fund to the judg-
ment creditor, balance to the mortgagee.
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SALES.
In Bank v. Anderson, 44 At. io66, the defendant held a
note of A., with certain stock as collateral. Learning that the
Fraud in stock was worthless, since its issue was unautbor-
Transferof ized, the defendant refused to renew the note, and
Collateral A. arranged with the plaintiff bank for its discount.
The defendant sent the note and stock to the bank, which paid
the defendant the value of his interest in the stock and the
balance was paid to A. No mention was made by the defend-
ant of the worthlessness of the stock. In an action by the
bank against the defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held that, since there was no sale to the bank, the con-
cealment by the defendant, did not amount to a fraud, Fell, J.,
saying: "There is no foundation whatever for the contention
that the transaction was a sale by the defendants of their claim
on the note and collateral. It was not, either in form or in
substance, a sale, and none of the parties so regarded it at the
time. It was merely the borrowing of one party to pay an
overdue note held by another, and nothing more can be made
of it." While the decision may be correct, yet, if the transac-
tion did not amount to a sale of the defendant's interest in the
stock to the bank, it certainly came very near to it.
WILLS.
Hoysradtv. Tionesta Gas Co., 45 Atl. 62, shows the dis-
tinction between a sale by virtue of an order of court and a
Power to sale where the court merely designates the vendor.
convey Land, A will had been probated in New York, and a
Foreign copy filed in the county of Pennsylvania where
Probate land of the testator was situate, according to
the act of March 15, 1832 (P. L. 135 ) . Under the will the
executor had power to convey the land. The executor
died, and the New York court appointed a successor, by whom
a conveyance was made, the validity of which was the subject
of the present controversy.
It was strongly urged against the conveyance that the ex-
ecutor could derive no power to convey land in Pennsylvania
by virtue of his New York appointment, but the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania decided that the executor derived his
power from the will and not from his appointment, which latter
was merely a designation of the person entitled to act under
the will, and which was made by the only court having power
to make such designation.
